Michigan Law Review
Volume 118

Issue 5

2020

Thoughts, Crimes, and Thought Crimes
Gabriel S. Mendlow
University of Michigan Law School, mendlow@umich.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Public Law and Legal Theory Commons

Recommended Citation
Gabriel S. Mendlow, Thoughts, Crimes, and Thought Crimes, 118 MICH. L. REV. 841 (2020).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol118/iss5/4

https://doi.org/10.36644/mlr.118.5.thoughts
This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

THOUGHTS, CRIMES, AND THOUGHT CRIMES
Gabriel S . Mendlow*
Thought crimes are the stuff of dystopian fiction, not contemporary law . Or
so we’re told . Yet our criminal legal system may in a sense punish thought
regularly, even as our existing criminal theory lacks the resources to recognize
this state of affairs for what it is—or to explain what might be wrong with it .
The beginning of wisdom lies in the seeming rhetorical excesses of those who
complain that certain terrorism and hate crime laws punish offenders for
their malevolent intentions while purporting to punish them for their conduct . Behind this too-easily-written-off complaint is a half-buried precept of
criminal jurisprudence, one that this Essay aims to excavate, elaborate, and
defend: that the proper target of an offender’s punishment is always the criminal action itself, not the offender’s associated mental state conceived as a
separate wrong . Taken seriously, this precept would change how we punish
an assortment of criminal offenses, from attempts to hate crimes to terrorism .
It also would change how we conceive the criminal law’s core axioms, especially the poorly understood but surprisingly important doctrine of concurrence .
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INTRODUCTION
Sophocles’s Ajax is among other things a play about thought crime. It
begins just after the Greek commanders have awarded the armor of Achilles
to Odysseus, the worthiest and wisest Greek to survive the Trojan War, but
not the strongest in battle. That honor belongs to the dimwitted Ajax, who is
humiliated at having been passed over. In the play’s opening scene, the goddess Athena describes how Ajax had sneaked up on the commanders’ camp
the night before, planning to torture and kill them. But Athena intervened at
the last second, clouding Ajax’s mind so that he would mistake the army’s
sheep for his human targets. When Ajax discovers later in the play that the
men he thought he had tortured to death were actually livestock, he commits
suicide in embarrassment. But his death does little to mollify his intended
victims. Menelaus is especially unforgiving, demanding that the Greeks leave
Ajax’s body unburied, a punishment extremely severe in that it would prevent Ajax’s soul from entering the afterlife. Menelaus doesn’t care that Ajax’s
conduct ultimately posed no threat. He cares only about Ajax’s murderous
intention, which he equates with murder itself. Is it “just,” asks Menelaus,
“that my murderer have a peaceful end? . . . By his will, I am dead.” 1
If the punishment Menelaus demands is extreme, the rationale he offers
for it is not. In branding Ajax’s murderous intention a serious wrong, Menelaus gives voice to an idea familiar from ordinary morality and the criminal
law. When you pursue a malevolent purpose through ineffective means, your
evil mental state may attract stronger censure than your in-itself-innocuous
conduct. If you point a gun at someone and pull the trigger, and the gun
turns out to be a fake, we will blame you for your failed action, but we will
blame you equally for your malevolent intention. In fact, we probably will
blame you more for your intention than for your action—judging it more
severely and condemning you for it more harshly. And if we prosecute you

1. SOPHOCLES, AIAS (AJAX), in SOPHOCLES: THE SEVEN PLAYS IN ENGLISH VERSE 43, 74
(Lewis Campbell trans., rev. ed. 1933) (emphasis added).
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for a criminal attempt, we may take a page from Menelaus and demand that
you serve a long prison sentence.
If imposed, that prison sentence may in turn draw a pointed criticism:
that you are being punished not for your in-itself-innocuous conduct but for
the evil state of mind that motivated it. We are likeliest to hear this sort of
criticism when your methods aren’t just ineffective but are by their nature
incapable of bringing your purpose to fruition—when you seek to kill someone by sticking pins in a doll, for example. In that case, the innocuousness of
your conduct contrasts starkly with the malevolence of your state of mind.
But whenever the badness of your state of mind exceeds by any appreciable
degree the badness of your conduct, punishing you for a criminal attempt
may draw the accusation that you are being punished for your thoughts (a
word I’ll use to denote the entire class of mental states).
So the venerable law of attempts has something in common with recently enacted terrorism and hate crime offenses: all have been accused of punishing people for their thoughts. 2 It is an accusation that can seem
hyperbolic. No terrorism or hate crime offense, and certainly no attempt
statute, actually punishes defendants who’ve failed to act. But critics don’t
mean that these laws neglect to prohibit conduct. They mean that the nominally prohibited conduct isn’t what these laws truly aim to censure and sanction. When you commit an attempt or violate a terrorism or hate crime law,
you act with a particular mental state: the intention to commit a crime, the
intention to promote or facilitate terrorism, or the hatred of some group.
And it is this mental state taken in itself, rather than your outward conduct,
that critics see as the true object of punishment—the real transgression for
which the law imposes censure and sanction.
This criticism raises two questions, which the present Essay seeks to answer. The first is whether the criticism is factually accurate: Does any criminal statute really punish offenders not for their outward conduct but for
their inner states of mind, conceived as transgressions unto themselves? The
second question is whether the criticism is truly a criticism: Is there anything
amiss about a statute that treats an actor’s mental state, taken in itself, as the
ultimate object of punishment, as long as that mental state is executed
through or realized in the actor’s conduct?

2. KENT ROACH, THE 9/11 EFFECT: COMPARATIVE COUNTER-TERRORISM 449 (2011)
(“Many new terrorism offenses enacted after 9/11 pushed the envelope of inchoate liability and
came dangerously close to creating status offenses, thought crimes, and guilt by association.”);
Susan Gellman, Hate Crime Laws Are Thought Crime Laws, 1992/1993 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 509,
514–15 (“The only substantive element of most hate crime statutes is that the defendant had a
bias motive for committing the base offense. As motive consists solely of the defendant’s
thoughts, the additional penalty for motive amounts to a thought crime . . . .” (emphasis and
citation omitted)); Gideon Yaffe, Criminal Attempts, 124 YALE L.J. 92, 101 (2014)
(“[S]ubjectivists [about criminal attempts] conclude that . . . attempts are properly punished
thanks to their mens rea elements. From this point of view, attempts are thought crimes. The
fundamental challenge for subjectivists, then, is to explain why it is not monstrous for a liberal
society to punish attempts.”).
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The conventional answer to the second question is no. No recognized
axiom of criminal jurisprudence forbids the law to punish you for a mental
state that is executed through or realized in your conduct. As I’ll explain in
Part I of the Essay, punishment for an executed mental state doesn’t flout the
voluntary act requirement, which says (only) that the law mustn’t punish you
in the absence of voluntary conduct. Nor does punishment for an executed
mental state flout Justinian’s maxim cogitationis poenam nemo patitur, 3
which says (only) that the law mustn’t punish you for a mere mental state—
one on which you have not yet begun to act. No principle of conventional
jurisprudence says what the critics of terrorism and hate crime laws presuppose: that the object of an offender’s punishment, the transgression for
which the offender’s punishment is imposed, must always be an action. I use
the term “action” to denominate a broad and familiar category of doings, a
category that encompasses both affirmative conduct and voluntary omissions but excludes activity that is entirely mental, such as believing, desiring,
fantasizing, and intending. An action in this familiar sense may have a mental component that, taken separately, is a mental doing, such as resolutely
intending to achieve a goal. Conventional criminal theory contains no principle rendering such mental doings off limits—no principle requiring that
the law punish you only for your actions and never for the mental states that
your actions partly comprise, conceived as separate transgressions. In short,
conventional jurisprudence contains no action-as-object requirement.
The requirement’s absence matters—both for the scope of the criminal
law (which offenses the state may punish) and for the apportionment of
punishment (how severely the state may punish them). Absent the action-asobject requirement, the state may punish you as soon as your conduct evinces a malevolent intention, and the state may punish you harshly for that intention even if the conduct that evinces it merits far less condemnation in
itself. A criminal legal system that respected the action-as-object requirement would differ subtly but significantly. Offenders whose conduct was
minimally wrongful would receive only a minimal punishment, despite the
malevolence of their intentions. The law would apportion offenders’ punishment to the gravity of their conduct, not to the gravity of any associated
mental states. A judge could enhance offenders’ sentences based on the malevolence of their mental states only if those mental states affected the badness or blameworthiness of their actions.
Critics of terrorism and hate crime laws seem to take the action-asobject requirement as given. But no learned treatise recounts the principle,
no judicial opinion expressly endorses it, and many criminal theorists implicitly reject it. I refer particularly to those theorists partial to the “subjectiv-

3 . See 4 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN § 48.19.18 (Alan Watson ed., rev. ed. 1998). For a
discussion of the foundations of Justinian’s maxim, see Gabriel S. Mendlow, Why Is It Wrong
to Punish Thought?, 127 YALE L.J. 2342 (2018).
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ist” version of the offense of attempts,4 which Britain’s preeminent twentieth-century scholar of criminal law, Glanville Williams, approvingly described as “punishing [the attempter] for his intention, the act [of
attempting] being required [merely] as evidence of a firm intention.”5
It is my contention that the action-as-object requirement is nevertheless
a principle we should embrace. As I’ll argue in Part II, the action-as-object
requirement is compelling not only as a principle of political morality—one
that precludes a kind of indirect mind control—but also, and even more so,
as a principle of criminal theory. If we embraced the action-as-object requirement as a core legal axiom, we would discern a deep unity among the
seemingly miscellaneous principles of criminal jurisprudence: the voluntary
act requirement, Justinian’s maxim, and the requirements of actus reus,
mens rea, and concurrence. We would see these principles as implementing
doctrines of the action-as-object requirement—not as disparate precepts with
independent functions but as principles working in service of a common
end: to help ensure that criminal statutes punish offenders only for their actions, conceived not as mere aggregates of (bad) acts and (culpable) mental
states, but as psychological and moral unities.
In defending the action-as-object requirement, the Essay will accordingly uncover a second unsung principle of criminal law: the essential unity of
criminal wrongs. This unity is something that conventional criminal doctrine obscures. The formal distinction between actus reus and mens rea invites us to misconceive the criminal wrong as a pair of wrongs—the bad act
and the blameworthy mental state. To think of criminal wrongs this way is to
take too literally Justice Robert Jackson’s oft-quoted remark that “crime, as a
compound concept . . . [is] constituted . . . from concurrence of an evilmeaning mind with an evil-doing hand.”6 As we will see, the true point of
the largely overlooked and rarely understood requirement of concurrence is
to forge from the offender’s act and mental state a unitary action, an action
that owes its moral and therefore criminal identity to the mental state with
which it is performed. Although authors of criminal law casebooks tend to
ignore the concurrence requirement, it is in fact fundamental to criminal ju-

4. George P. Fletcher appears to have been the first person to distinguish “objectivist”
and “subjectivist” theories of attempts. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, R ETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW
138 (1978). In Fletcher’s usage, an “objectivist” theory of attempts employs “a legal standard
for assessing conduct that does not presuppose a prior determination of the actor’s intent,”
whereas, for the “subjectivist” theory, “[t]he act of execution is important so far as it verifies
the firmness of the intent. No act of specific contours is necessary to constitute the attempt, for
any act will suffice to demonstrate the actor’s commitment to carry out his criminal plan.” Id.
In the spirit of Fletcher’s distinction, I will use the term “subjectivist” to denote a particular
version of the attempt offense, one where the attempter’s intention, and not the act by which
the attempter seeks to carry the intention out, serves as the transgression for which the law
holds the attempter liable.
5. GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 631 (2d ed. 1983).
6. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952).
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risprudence, in part because it serves to promote compliance with the action-as-object requirement.
Part III of the Essay will show how the action-as-object requirement,
although unacknowledged, figures covertly in judicial reasoning and critical
commentary. As I noted a moment ago, critics of the war on terror implicitly
draw on the action-as-object requirement when they protest that many of
the counterterrorism laws in force throughout the Anglophone world come
“dangerously close” to punishing thought. These laws nominally proscribe
conduct, but what they really sanction and condemn, according to their critics, is an offender’s malevolent state of mind, the proscribed conduct being
too incipient or insubstantial to be the true object of punishment. 7 This
complaint evokes a classic objection to hate crime penalty-enhancement
laws: that they impermissibly impose extra punishment for an offender’s
hateful motives—punishment in addition to what is imposed for the offender’s violent conduct. Courts virtually always reject these complaints, but never on the ground that the law may treat a person’s mental states as objects of
punishment provided they are realized in the person’s conduct. Like the litigants whose claims they reject, courts adhere to the action-as-object requirement implicitly. Courts consistently say more than they need to say in order
to show that statutes accused of punishing people for their thoughts satisfy
the voluntary act requirement and Justinian’s maxim. Courts say precisely
what is necessary to show that these statutes comply with the action-asobject requirement.
But are courts right to imply that the challenged statutes all comply?
Part IV will explain why this question is harder to resolve than the sometimes facile reasoning of courts might suggest. Resolving the question requires determining (among other things) whether the severity of offenders’
sentences is proportionate to the gravity of their actions, no “extra” punishment having been apportioned to their mental states conceived as transgressions unto themselves. To the extent that such questions of proportionality
are difficult and contentious and potentially unresolvable, so too will be
questions about whether terrorism and hate crime laws impermissibly punish people for their thoughts.
I.

THE ACTION-AS-OBJECT REQUIREMENT AND CONVENTIONAL CRIMINAL
JURISPRUDENCE

There’s a gap in conventional criminal jurisprudence: a node in the web
of axioms where a principle could be but isn’t. One conventional axiom, the
voluntary act requirement, says that the state may not punish you in the absence of a voluntary act or omission. A related but distinct principle of criminal law is Justinian’s maxim cogitationis poenam nemo patitur. Often
presented as an alternative formulation of the act requirement and sometimes offered as its rationale, Justinian’s maxim is actually neither of these

7 .

See infra notes 75–84 and accompanying text.
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things. It says simply that you may not be punished for a mere thought—a
belief, desire, fantasy, or unexecuted intention. What no principle of conventional criminal jurisprudence says is that you may not be punished for a
thought that is executed through or realized in your conduct. Conventional
jurisprudence contains no action-as-object requirement.
If acknowledged and embraced, the action-as-object requirement would
fill a gap in criminal theory, a gap left by the fact that Justinian’s maxim and
the voluntary act requirement speak in different registers. Justinian’s maxim
is substantive: it speaks to what may or may not be an object of penal liability—what sort of transgression (or supposed transgression) punishment may
be imposed for. By contrast, the voluntary act requirement, as formulated in
legal materials 8 and as understood by commentators, 9 isn’t substantive but
conditional. 10 Unlike Justinian’s maxim, the voluntary act requirement
doesn’t speak to what may or may not be an object of liability. It speaks instead to what conditions must obtain before penal liability may be imposed.
It says specifically (and only) that the state may not punish you unless it
proves that you have performed some voluntary act or voluntary omission. It

8 . See, e .g ., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1985) (“A person is not
guilty of an offense unless his liability is based on conduct that includes a voluntary act or the
omission to perform an act of which he is physically capable.”); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 26
(West 2014) (“All persons are capable of committing crimes except those belonging to the following classes: . . . Persons who committed the act charged without being conscious thereof.”);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.10 (McKinney 2009) (“The minimal requirement for criminal liability is
the performance by a person of conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act which he is physically capable of performing.”); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.01(a)
(West 2011) (“A person commits an offense only if he voluntarily engages in conduct, including an act, an omission, or possession.”).
9 . See, e .g ., Douglas Husak, The Alleged Act Requirement in Criminal Law, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 107, 111 (John Deigh & David
Dolinko eds., 2011) (“This much is common to any suitable [formulation of the act requirement]: some act is required for criminal liability. But whatever the act required by the act requirement is, it need not be that for which liability is imposed.”).
10. In contrasting conditional and substantive principles, I draw on R.A. Duff’s helpful
distinction between “the conditions of liability” and “the intentional objects of liability.” As
Duff explains:
When I am blamed, or condemned, or held liable, there is something for which I
am blamed, condemned, or held liable: which is to say that blame, condemnation
and holdings of liability require an intentional object on which they are focused
and towards which they are directed. Within any practice of blame, condemnation, or holding liable, there will also be conditions of liability—conditions which
must be satisfied if the blame, condemnation, or holding liable is to be justified . . .
but which are not themselves part of the object of the blame, condemnation, or liability. It is, for instance, a condition of being justly blamed, or condemned, or
held liable for a wrong I have committed that I am not mentally disordered in a
way that undermines my responsibility for that action: but I am not blamed, or
condemned, or held liable for not being mentally disordered.

R.A. Duff, Virtue, Vice, and Criminal Liability: Do We Want an Aristotelian Criminal Law?, 6
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 147, 155 (2002).
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doesn’t say that the state may punish you only for an act or omission. 11 As
typically formulated, the act requirement says nothing about the substance of
what we criminalize.
Because the act requirement is conditional while Justinian’s maxim is
substantive, the two principles are logically independent. So a statute that
satisfies one might violate the other. That a statute satisfies Justinian’s maxim doesn’t mean that it satisfies the act requirement: even if a statute avoids
imposing punishment for an unexecuted thought, it might nevertheless impose punishment for a status or involuntary act. Conversely, that a statute
satisfies the act requirement doesn’t mean that it satisfies Justinian’s maxim:
even if a statute includes an act or omission among its elements, it might
nevertheless impose punishment for an unexecuted thought. Consider
Douglas Husak’s example of the group of “legislators [who] become convinced that existing statutes [are] ineffective in punishing persons who
[have] been disloyal to the monarch and propose a new statute that define[s]
treason as ‘compassing the death of the king.’ ” 12 When told that the proposed statute violates the act requirement, “the legislators agree to amend
the statute to include an additional clause that allows liability to be imposed
only on persons who had performed the act of eating at some time prior to
the moment at which they compassed the death of the king.” 13 So amended,
the statute now satisfies the act requirement: it provides that penal liability
may not be imposed on anyone who has compassed the death of the king
unless the state proves that the person previously performed the act of eating. But there is still something wrong with the statute—something obviously wrong. What is wrong with the statute is a matter of what the statute
imposes penal liability for—what it treats as the wrong or supposed wrong
for which punishment is imposed. The statute obviously doesn’t impose
punishment for the physical act of eating. The statute instead imposes punishment for the mental act of compassing the death of the king. This feature
of the statute seems objectionable not because of the act requirement, which
the statute satisfies, but because of Justinian’s maxim, which the statute (still)
violates. Despite including an act element, the statute treats an offender’s
possibly unexecuted intention as the underlying object of punishment, exemplifying to an extreme degree the subjectivist style of criminal legislation.
As Husak’s example shows, Justinian’s maxim (because it’s substantive)
precludes certain styles of criminalization that the act requirement tolerates
(because it’s conditional). But Justinian’s maxim is nonetheless highly permissive. Although it forbids the state to punish mere mental states—beliefs,
desires, fantasies, and unexecuted intentions—Justinian’s maxim doesn’t

11. For an in-depth examination of the difference between objects and conditions of
penal liability, see Gabriel S. Mendlow, The Elusive Object of Punishment, 25 LEGAL THEORY
105 (2019).
12. DOUGLAS HUSAK, Does Criminal Liability Require an Act?, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF
CRIMINAL LAW: SELECTED ESSAYS 17, 26 (2010).
13. Id .
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forbid the state to target a mental state that is realized in a person’s conduct.
So Justinian’s maxim in no way precludes the subjectivist style of criminalization. Nor, for that matter, does the act requirement. “Under the criminal
law’s voluntary act requirement,” writes Adam Kolber, “we do not punish
people’s culpable mental states unless they take some implementing action.” 14
Subjectivist offenses almost always require an implementing action and
therefore almost never violate the act requirement. 15
In our legal tradition, the clearest and probably oldest subjectivist crime
is the offense on which Husak’s example is obviously based: the English offense of treason. The Treason Act 1351 provides that “when a man doth
compass or imagine the death of . . . the King . . . and thereof be provably attainted of open deed by the people of their condition . . . that ought to be adjudged treason.” 16 Seizing on the breadth of this provision, contemporary
commentators often say that a person once could be held for treason merely
for intending the king’s death. That is a pervasive misconception, and we
should correct it. As Sir Matthew Hale recounts, only briefly was the law of
treason governed by a statute that “ma[de] the bare purposing, or compassing, treason, without any overt-act.” 17 At all other times, treason required an
“open deed.” What seems very likely, however, is that the overt act element
was for several centuries nothing but a condition on which an offender could
be punished for an underlying treasonous intention (a “compassing” or “imagining”). The classic commentators on the early English law of treason,
Hale and Sir Edward Coke, both spoke of the overt act element as serving no
purpose but to prove the existence of an underlying mental wrong. 18 In early
centuries, courts sometimes held that a defendant could satisfy the overt act
requirement just by making treasonous utterances and writings, 19 their sufficiency in a given case seemingly a function of whether they were reliable
proof of the actor’s treasonous intent. 20 Moreover, when the overt act alleged
was a piece of nonverbal conduct, the conduct itself was often trifling—far
less robust than that demanded by any modern attempt statute. 21 As administered, the Treason Act complied both with the act requirement (some con-

14. Adam J. Kolber, Two Views of First Amendment Thought Privacy, 18 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 1381, 1398 (2016) (emphasis added).
15. The exception is when a statute prohibits “an ‘act’ that is less an act than a neutral
background condition” in human life (e.g., possessing money), “leaving behind a barely executed intention as the underlying object of punishment.” Mendlow, supra note 11, at 127.
16. Graham S McBain, High Treason: Killing the Sovereign or Her Judges, 20 KING’S L.J.
457, 460–61 (2009) (citations omitted).
17. 1 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF PLEAS OF THE CROWN 111 (Sollom Emlyn ed.,
1778).
18 . Id . at 108; EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 5–6 (1644); see also 2 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
OF ENGLAND 249 (1883).
19 . See McBain, supra note 16, at 463 n.57 (discussing cases).
20 . See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *80.
21 . See, e .g ., HALE, supra note 17, at 115–17.
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duct was required) and with Justinian’s maxim (the intention for which liability was imposed had to be partially executed, even if only barely). But the
Treason Act surely violated the action-as-object requirement: it aimed to
punish offenders for their treacherous intentions.
Although the modern attempt offense requires a far more substantial actus reus than treason once did, many theorists over the past two centuries
have given the offense of attempt an equally subjectivist gloss. In his nineteenth-century Lectures on Jurisprudence, John Austin said, “Generally, attempts are perfectly innocuous, and the party is punished, not in respect of
the attempt, but in respect of what he intended to do.” 22 By the late twentieth
century, the Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice spoke more broadly of a subjectivist trend permeating all of criminal law but reaching its zenith in
“modern attempt law [which] comes fairly close to the punishment of mere
intentions. What little conduct on the part of the accused is required (and
sometimes that is minimal indeed) is explicitly seen as serving an evidentiary
role of corroborating the accused’s criminal intent.” 23 The contemporary
theorist R.A. Duff describes this approach to attempt liability as insisting
that “the object of criminal responsibility is the firm intention to commit the
crime . . . ; we are . . . criminally responsible for the intention, on condition
that we undertook a suitable act towards fulfilling it.” 24 The most influential
exposition of this approach is the Commentary to the Model Penal Code’s
attempt provision, which declares that “the proper focus of attention is the
actor’s disposition.” 25 Glossing the MPC attempt provision, Husak concludes
that if the “[a]ctus reus is important . . . only insofar as it provides evidence of
criminal intent[,] the requirement has no independent significance. Hence it
appears inescapable that liability [under the MPC’s attempt provision] is really for . . . an intent.” 26
If the offense of attempt truly imposes punishment for an actor’s intention, then liability for an attempt should arise well before offenders complete
their intended crimes—precisely as the MPC provides. 27 Furthermore, all
else equal, punishment for an unsuccessful attempt should be as severe as
punishment for a successful one (which the MPC generally allows 28), and an
attempter’s sentence should hold constant no matter how close the attempter
comes to completing the intended crime. If not all of these important implications have received all of the scrutiny they deserve, that is partly because

22. 1 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 507 (Robert Campbell ed., Lawbook
Exch., Ltd. 5th ed. 2005) (1885).
23. Meir Dan Cohen, Actus Reus, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 15, 17
(Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983).
24. R.A. DUFF, ANSWERING FOR CRIME: RESPONSIBILITY AND LIABILITY IN THE
CRIMINAL LAW 96 (2007).
25. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 cmt. 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
26. DOUGLAS N. HUSAK, PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 95 (1987) (footnote omitted).
27. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 cmt. 5.
28 . Id . § 5.05(1).
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courts and commentators haven’t openly embraced the action-as-object requirement.
II.

THE CASE FOR THE ACTION-AS-OBJECT REQUIREMENT

In this Part, I will argue that the action-as-object requirement is both a
compelling principle of political morality and a powerful, unifying precept of
criminal jurisprudence. As a principle of political morality, the action-asobject requirement precludes a kind of indirect mind control. As a precept of
criminal jurisprudence, the action-as-object requirement grounds and unifies a seemingly disparate set of legal axioms: the voluntary act requirement,
Justinian’s maxim, the principles of mens rea and actus reus, and the poorly
understood doctrine of concurrence, which, though ignored by casebook authors, turns out to be as important to criminal jurisprudence as the act requirement and Justinian’s maxim.
A. The Action-as-Object Requirement as a Principle of Political Morality
As a principle of political morality, the action-as-object requirement
rests on the same justification as Justinian’s maxim. I don’t mean the standard justification, however. The standard justification for holding unexecuted
intentions unpunishable is that unexecuted intentions are never harmful,
harm-risking, culpably wrongful, or provable. None of this is true of intentions that an actor has taken at least a step or two to carry out. (None of it is
true of unexecuted intentions either, but that is another story, and I have told
it elsewhere. 29) Our heavily subjectivist criminal law assumes (as I will) that
executed and partly executed intentions are often harmful or harm-risking,
often culpably wrongful, and often provable. If they are immune from punishment nevertheless, their immunity cannot derive from any of the principles that commentators typically (albeit mistakenly) take to underlie
Justinian’s maxim: the harm principle, the requirement that criminal transgressions be culpable wrongs, and the requirement that criminal transgressions be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
I propose that the immunity of executed intentions derives instead from
a pair of principles concerning the right to freedom of mind and the relationship between punishment and policing (principles I’ve argued elsewhere
also underlie Justinian’s maxim 30). One of these principles is familiar; the
other, basically unnoticed. The familiar principle is that people possess a
right of mental integrity, a right to be free from the forcible manipulation of
their minds. It is a right the state would violate directly and paradigmatically
if it sought to alter your thoughts using involuntarily administered psychotropic drugs without a compelling and immediate justification, such as the
need to prevent you from hurting yourself or someone else. The unnoticed

29 .
30 .

See Mendlow, supra note 3.
Id .

852

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 118:841

principle, which I have previously called the Enforceability Constraint, 31
holds that the state may not impose punishment for a supposed transgression that, absent exigent circumstances, the state would not be permitted to
thwart or disrupt using direct force: the state may impose punishment for a
given transgression only if it may forcibly disrupt that transgression on the
ground that it is criminally wrongful.
Like the right of mental integrity, the Enforceability Constraint rests on
a moral foundation. Suppose the state would violate your rights if it disrupted a given transgression of yours for the reason that the transgression is
criminally wrongful (rather than, say, for the more exigent reason that the
transgression poses an imminent risk of harm). If it indeed is the case that
the state would violate your rights if it disrupted your transgression on the
ground that it is criminally wrongful, then it would seem to follow that the
state also would violate your rights if it disrupted your transgression for the
same reason but in a particular indirect fashion: by imposing terrible consequences on you for committing the transgression. Yet that is exactly what the
state does when it punishes you. 32
If these two principles are sound—the right to mental integrity and the
Enforceability Constraint—they jointly render all mental states immune
from punishment: not only the unexecuted intentions protected by Justinian’s maxim but also the executed intentions protected by the action-asobject requirement. The basic idea is straightforward: when the state punishes you for a mental state—whether that mental state is wholly unexecuted or
fully realized in your conduct—the state indirectly violates your right to
mental integrity.
The contrast between direct and indirect rights violations mirrors the
contrast between direct and indirect modes of enforcing the penal law. In
our system of criminal administration, the state may ensure compliance with
penal norms not only through the imposition of punishment ex post but also
through the use of coercive force ex ante. The Enforceability Constraint
maintains that these two enforcement authorities are normatively intertwined: it maintains that the state may punish someone for transgressions of
a given type only when it may in principle use reasonable force to thwart
such transgressions as they happen, merely on the ground that they are criminally wrongful. In other words, if transgressions of a given type are immune
from ex ante interference on grounds of wrongfulness, then they are also
immune from punishment. The reason, I’ve suggested, is this: if coercively
enforcing a given norm ex ante would violate your rights, so would enforcing that norm ex post through the threat and imposition of the severest form
of sanction and censure. 33 It follows that, if the state would violate your right
to mental integrity if it used direct force to disrupt your criminal intentions
simply because they were censurable transgressions, so too would the state
31 .
32 .
33 .

Id .
See id . at 2371–73 (giving an informal proof of the Enforceability Constraint).
See id .
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violate your right to mental integrity if it treated your criminal intentions as
objects of punishment.
The question, then, is whether the state in fact violates your right to
mental integrity when it uses direct force to disrupt your criminal intentions
merely on the ground that they are censurable transgressions. I submit that
the answer is yes, although I do not know how to justify that answer other
than by thought experiments like the following one. Imagine you are on your
way to the bank, intending to rob it. You are close to the bank and heavily
armed, so we may suppose that you are already guilty of attempted bank
robbery. Even so, your criminal intention doesn’t yet pose an imminent
threat. There is still time to arrest you or to try to talk you out of it. Yet
agents of the state propose instead to disrupt your criminal intention using
psychotropic gas, involuntary hypnosis, a mind-control beam, or some other
kind of psychosurgical policing that would force you to change your mind or
forget what you were doing. Does the mere fact that your intention violates a
penal norm—the norm created by a subjectivist law of attempts—justify psychosurgical policing? My intuition is that it does not. Psychosurgical policing
of this sort—disrupting your intention through direct and forcible mental
intrusion on the mere ground that it is a criminal wrong—strikes me as violating your right to mental integrity under the circumstances. 34
To posit a right to mental integrity with this degree of robustness is not
to posit a right that is absolute. If the right were absolute, forcible manipulation of a person’s mind would be forbidden absolutely—and it isn’t. To borrow an example I’ve used before, 35 suppose the police have only two ways of
stopping a would-be killer: running her over with a car or exposing her to
hallucinogenic gas, a temporary psychical restraint. The threat is grave, while
the psychical restraint is a mild invasion of the would-be killer’s mental integrity—far milder an invasion of her rights than running her over. It seems
clear that the police may deploy the hallucinogenic gas, forcibly disrupting
the would-be killer’s intention for the sake of public safety. But that is a far
cry from forcibly disrupting her intention on the ground that it is a censurable transgression. Per the Enforceability Constraint, however, disrupting the
intention on the ground that it is a censurable transgression is the sort of disruption that the state must in principle be permitted to undertake if the state
is permitted to treat the intention as an object of punishment. So we can
concede that the right to mental integrity is nonabsolute—as we should—
while maintaining that mental states are nonetheless immune from punishment.

34. A fuller analysis of the right to mental integrity would address the difficult question
of what distinguishes direct and forcible mind control from softer modes of suggestion and
suasion that leave a person’s mental integrity tolerably intact. I will say nothing about this important question here. I will assume instead that the right to mental integrity protects against
the psychic equivalent of a bodily assault, a paradigmatic example being the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication.
35 . See Mendlow, supra note 3, at 2379.
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B. The Action-as-Object Requirement as a Precept of Criminal Jurisprudence
In the previous Section, I sought to justify the action-as-object requirement by grounding it in a pair of principles concerning the right to freedom
of mind and the relationship between punishment and policing. That argument lent support to the action-as-object requirement by undermining the
subjectivist style of criminal administration that the requirement forbids. 36
One might wonder, however, whether the argument didn’t also undermine
the doctrine of mens rea, a core feature of the criminal law. I argued that if
the state may not disrupt a partly executed mental state merely on the
ground that it is a censurable transgression, then neither may the state treat
such a mental state as an object of punishment. But ordinary crimes of mens
rea might seem to do exactly that: they might seem to punish offenders for
the combination of a bodily movement and an accompanying mental state,
thereby treating offenders’ executed or partly executed mental states as objects of punishment. This implication might seem to present a reductio ad
absurdum of the action-as-object requirement. For if it really were impermissible for the state to punish an individual for a realized or executed mental state, wouldn’t it also have to be impermissible for the state to punish
someone for an offense that includes a realized or executed mental state
among its elements, as most offenses do? Wouldn’t that amount to punishing the person for a mental state? The action-as-object requirement would
seem to entail—absurdly—that criminal offenses may not involve mens rea.
The action-as-object requirement doesn’t actually entail any such thing.
But to see why, we must reject the false yet influential conception of criminal
wrongs that the foregoing line of argument presupposes: a conception according to which a criminal wrong is the mere conjunction of a (bad) act
and a (culpable) mental state. This conception of a criminal wrong envisions
it as an aggregate rather than a unity. In Bertrand Russell’s terminology, 37
unities are entities defined in part by the specific relations between their
parts. Aggregates are entities defined entirely by which parts they have, the
parts themselves bearing no relation to one another other than comembership in the aggregate. If the typical penal statute punishes an aggregative
wrong consisting of the conjunction of a (bad) act and a (culpable) mental
state, then the typical penal statute punishes an offender in part for her mental state. And that is something that the action-as-object requirement indeed
forbids—seemingly to its grave discredit. But, as I’ll explain in a moment,
criminal wrongs aren’t aggregates—bad acts that happen to coincide with
culpable mental states. Criminal wrongs are actions made bad by culpable

36. Although the argument lent support to the action-as-object requirement, it didn’t
prove the requirement conclusively. Establishing that the state may not punish mental states
doesn’t suffice to establish that the state may punish only actions. That is because the universe
of possible objects of punishment includes more than just mental states and actions. It also includes such things as statuses and involuntary acts—things that I will herein assume are immune from punishment.
37. 1 BERTRAND RUSSELL, THE PRINCIPLES OF MATHEMATICS 140–41 (1903).
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mental states—or, if not made bad, then made worse, or made blameworthy.
Criminal wrongs are unitary wrongs, wholes whose parts are integrally related. Punishing you for a criminal wrong therefore isn’t a matter of punishing
you at once for your action and for your culpable mental state. It is a matter
of punishing you for your culpable action.
If we have trouble seeing a difference between these two modes of punishment, it is because we’re accustomed to thinking and theorizing about real penal statutes, and real penal statutes never punish aggregative wrongs.
We can appreciate the difference if we reflect for a moment on a fictional
statute that does punish an aggregative wrong: a statute that makes it an offense to litter while intending to murder someone. The object of punishment
under this fictional statute is a gerrymandered disjunction, the hybrid of a
thought (an intention to commit murder) and an unrelated action (an act of
littering). The only required connection between the two elements is contemporaneity. The offender need not litter in order to execute his intention
to murder: although a rare offender may litter as part of a murder plot, such
an offender is no guiltier of violating our imaginary statute than is a hitman
who thoughtlessly flicks a cigarette butt onto the sidewalk while mentally
planning his next hit. Because the required intention is disconnected from
the required action—potentially disconnected from any action—it seems
natural to say that the statute imposes punishment for an intention, even as
it also imposes punishment for an action. If our hitman were convicted of
two separate offenses—the offense of littering and the offense of intending to
murder—we wouldn’t hesitate to describe the second of these offenses as
punishing the hitman for his intention, in violation of the action-as-object
requirement. Joining these two offenses in a single statute would make no
difference.
Compare the fictional statute to a real one, a Florida statute that criminalizes perpetrating an assault “[w]ith [the] intent to commit a felony.” 38 The
Florida statute bears a superficial resemblance to the fictional one: both
criminalize the combination of an action (littering/assaulting) and an intention (to kill/to commit a felony). Does the Florida statute therefore violate
the action-as-object requirement? If an offender were convicted of two separate offenses—the offense of “simple” assault and the (fictional) offense of
intending to commit a felony—we wouldn’t hesitate to describe the second
of these offenses as punishing the offender for an intention. Should we say
the same of the compound offense of assault with the intent to commit a felony? Should we say that, even though the compound offense punishes an action, it also imposes separate punishment for an intention?
We shouldn’t, because it doesn’t. Unlike the fictional offense of littering
with the intent to kill, the Florida offense of aggravated assault doesn’t punish the hybrid of two separate but simultaneous wrongs: an act of assault and
a contemporaneous intention to commit a felony. Far from being a gerrymandered pair, the assault and the intention are inseparably united. The as38.

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.021(1)(b) (West 2017).
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sault is the action that it is—morally as well as psychologically—because of
the intention with which it is performed. If the assault occurred without the
mental state, it would still be an action, but it would be an action of a morally
different sort. In the fictional statute, by contrast, littering and intending to
kill are fully distinct and fully separable, separable not just analytically but
also psychologically and morally. The action and mental state simply coincide. They could exist at different times, even in different people, without
losing their moral or psychological characters.
As these examples show, normal offense elements aren’t constituent
parts of aggregative wrongs; they are ingredients of unitary wrongs. 39 This is
perhaps easiest to see when an offense’s actus reus is not wrongful in itself.
“A person may give an official a gift that in fact influences his judgment,”
writes Husak, “but he has not committed bribery unless his intention in giving the gift was to influence the official’s judgment.” 40 Likewise, “[t]he act of
altering a writing is innocuous, but a person commits forgery when he alters
the writing with the purpose to defraud or injure another.” 41 Similarly, “[t]he
destruction of evidence of a crime is an everyday occurrence, but a person
commits an offense when he conceals or destroys evidence with the purpose
of hindering a prosecution.” 42 In none of these instances is the object of liability a mere aggregate of an action and an illicit intention, punishment being imposed separately for each. Minus the illicit intentions, these actions
aren’t wrongful and therefore aren’t plausible objects of punishment. In each
case, punishment is imposed for one thing only: the unitary wrong that the
offense elements create when jointly satisfied, an action made wrongful—
indeed, made the action that it is—by the illicit intention with which it is
performed. “Intention rarely operates as a mere ‘fault element’ in the criminal law,” explains Jeremy Horder. 43 “Its main role is in changing the normative significance of conduct. If, in appropriating your property, I intend
permanently to deprive you of it, that intention . . . . turn[s] my conduct
from something neutral (like putting goods in a shopping basket) into a substantive criminal offence.” 44 Horder concludes: “Without the intention to
commit the crime, there is not only no fault; there is simply no wrong.” 45

39 . Cf . Yaffe, supra note 2, at 119 (rejecting “the thought that the actus reus and mens
rea components of crimes make independent contributions to the criminality of the conduct”).
40. DOUGLAS N. HUSAK, The Costs to Criminal Theory of Supposing that Intentions Are
Irrelevant to Permissibility, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW: SELECTED ESSAYS, supra
note 12, at 69, 77.
41 . Id .
42 . Id . at 77–78.
43. Jeremy Horder, A Critique of the Correspondence Principle in Criminal Law, 1995
CRIM. L.R. 759, 762 [hereinafter Horder, A Critique of the Correspondence Principle in Criminal Law]; see also Jeremy Horder, Intention in the Criminal Law—A Rejoinder, 58 MOD. L.
REV. 678, 681–83 (1995) (describing the role of intentions in “constituting wrongs”).
44. Horder, A Critique of the Correspondence Principle in Criminal Law, supra note 43,
at 762 (footnote omitted).
45. Id .
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Horder’s point holds true not just of intentions but of mental states generally: mental states don’t merely undergird offenders’ culpability; they help
constitute offenders’ actions as particular criminal wrongs. Even actions that
are utterly harmless can be made wrongful, and thus punishable, by an accompanying mental state. Driving 100 miles per hour on a desolate road,
putting sugar in someone’s tea believing it to be poison—each of these actions is harmless in itself. Yet both are rightly punishable, the first as reckless
driving and the second as attempted murder. Each action owes its identity to
the mental state with which it is performed. That is why we may regard an
offender’s punishment as imposed for the action taken as a whole, rather
than imposed for each of the action’s constituents taken separately. Indeed,
even when an offense’s actus reus is not just harmless but entirely lawful taken in itself, it doesn’t follow that the object of punishment is the offense’s
mens rea element. There are nearly as many counterexamples to this supposed inference as there are crimes of mens rea. Shredding your old bank
statement is entirely lawful in itself, but when done for the purpose of hindering an investigation, it is obstruction of justice. It doesn’t follow that the
object of punishment under the obstruction statute is the intention to hinder
an investigation. The object of punishment is the action of obstructing justice,
an action that takes its identity, and accordingly its criminal character, from
the intention with which it is performed.
It is a property of actions generally, not just criminal ones, that they owe
their identities to the mental states with which they are performed. If you flip
a switch that activates a strobe light, what action do you perform? The answer depends on the intention with which you flip the switch. If you flip it
with the intention of illuminating the room, you perform the action of turning on the lights. If you flip it with the intention of inducing an epileptic seizure in someone climbing a ladder, you perform the action of trying to kill
someone. Your bodily movement (your “actus reus,” so to speak) is the same
in both cases. But your action is different, and it is different because of your
intention. An action is never just a bodily movement. It is a bodily movement done with a particular intention. 46 The intention is part of what constitutes the action as an action, and it is also part of what constitutes the action
as the particular action that it is.
A person’s intention can of course make the difference between manslaughter and murder, and thus make the difference between a brief prison
stint and the death penalty. But that is because the intention makes the difference between two different actions: an accidental killing and a murder.
There is usually no particular reason to posit that, in punishing you for your
attempted murder, we are “really” punishing you for your intention. What
we are really punishing you for is your wrongful action. Although the
wrongful action has two ingredients—the bodily movement and the accompanying intention—it is a single wrong nonetheless. What you’ll be resented,

46 . Cf . DONALD DAVIDSON, ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND EVENTS 61 (2d ed. 2001) (arguing
that an action is an event that is intentional “under some description[]”).
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criticized, and punished for is your action of attempted murder—not for
your mere bodily movement, not (ordinarily) for your intention taken in itself, and (certainly) not for the two of these taken as a brute aggregate.
Much the same is true of inchoate crimes generally, including even the
crime of attempt under the MPC—notwithstanding the views expressed by
its own commentators. 47 The MPC’s attempt provision requires that the actor perform “an act or omission constituting a substantial step in a course of
conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime,” 48 where an
act or omission is deemed not to be a substantial step “unless it is strongly
corroborative of the actor’s criminal purpose.” 49 Now a jurisdiction certainly
could administer the “substantial step” test so as to punish offenders solely
for their partially executed intentions: it could relentlessly apportion attempters’ punishments to the gravity of their mental states rather than the
gravity of their failed attempts, and it could punish so-called “impossible”
attempts, where the offender’s purpose is malevolent in the extreme (e.g., to
kill) while the offender’s method is utterly innocuous (e.g., sticking pins in a
doll). But a jurisdiction equally could administer the “substantial step” test
so as to punish offenders for their substantial steps, and many jurisdictions
may do just that. Whether they actually do is partly a function of how they
apportion an attempter’s punishment and whether they punish impossible
attempts. But it is also a function of how the relevant decisionmakers understand and describe the jurisdiction’s legal practices. 50 So it is surely significant that no jurisdiction describes its attempt statute as punishing offenders
for their intentions.
C. The True Meaning of Concurrence
To this point I’ve said nothing about a looming question: If criminal
wrongs aren’t aggregates but unities—entities defined not just by the identity
of their parts but by the way their parts are related—what is the nature of
that relation? What relation must obtain between the actus reus and mens
rea of an offense in order for these elements to function as ingredients of a
unitary wrong rather than as constituent parts of an aggregative wrong? One
obvious answer to this question is that the elements must “concur”—that
they must satisfy the concurrence requirement. But what exactly does the
concurrence requirement require?
“[T]here is concurrence,” says a leading treatise, “when the defendant’s
mental state actuates [her] physical conduct.” 51 Says another: “The defendant’s conduct . . . must have been set into motion or impelled by the thought

47. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 cmt. 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
48 . Id . § 5.01(1)(c).
49 . Id . § 5.01(2).
50. See Mendlow, supra note 11 (arguing that the wrong a statute punishes depends in
part on how the statute is administered and understood).
51. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 6.3(a) (3d ed. 2018).
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process that constituted the mens rea of the offense.” 52 These authorities
cannot mean simply that the defendant’s conduct must have been caused by
the defendant’s mental state. That minimal sort of connection wouldn’t be
enough to rule out cases of so-called deviant causation, where a person’s intention leads to conduct accidentally. 53 These authorities presumably mean
that there is concurrence when the defendant’s physical conduct executes her
mental state. A defendant’s conduct executes her mental state when the defendant’s mental state guides her conduct nonaccidentally. The paradigmatic
example is when the defendant performs an action in order to carry her intention out.
Does this mean that execution is the relation that must obtain between
the act and mental state elements of an offense in order for these elements to
function as ingredients of a unitary wrong? Although not addressed to this
question, some remarks of the criminal theorist Michael Moore imply an affirmative answer. Moore asks us to imagine a statute that makes it a crime
“to intend to bribe an official while at the same time whistling Dixie, combing one’s hair, or washing one’s cat.” 54 Moore contrasts this imaginary statute, which he says treats the voluntary act requirement as an “empty
formality,” 55 with the Interstate Travel Act, 56 which criminalizes interstate
travel undertaken with the intent to bribe officials or perform other corrupt
acts. 57 Moore implies that the Interstate Travel Act avoids punishing mere
intent because it “require[s] by way of an act . . . some act that executes,
however slightly, the culpable intention. Travelling interstate in order to
bribe an official satisfies such an act requirement; washing one’s cat while
intending to bribe an official does not.” 58 These remarks seem basically
sound, but they raise a further question: How is it that execution unites the
actus reus and mens rea elements of an offense to form a single wrong?
The answer, I believe, is that execution instantiates the type of moral relation demanded by the action-as-object requirement: the mental state
makes the corresponding act bad, worse, or blameworthy. But this is a relation that can occur even in the absence of execution—contrary to what

52.
53 .

JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 189 (8th ed. 2018).
See Gideon Yaffe, The Voluntary Act Requirement, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION
TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 174, 185 (Andrei Marmor ed., 2012) (“[S]ay that . . . D is at the
firing range and notices that V is passing between him and the target at which he is pointing.
Recalling that he earlier formed an intention to kill V, D becomes very nervous—‘My God,’ he
thinks, ‘I might actually go through with this!’—and his nervousness causes his hands to shake
violently, resulting in the bodily movement of his finger pulling the trigger. In such a case, the
bodily movement is not the manifestation of the intention of the sort that is required for [concurrence], or, as we say, for it to be the case that D is ‘acting on the intention.’ ”).
54. MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND CRIME: THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL LAW 19 n.5 (1993).
55 . Id .
56. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2018).
57. MOORE, supra note 54, at 19.
58 . Id . at 19 n.5.
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Moore’s remarks imply and what the textbook definition of concurrence asserts. One way in which a mental state, such as an intention, can make an action bad, worse, or blameworthy is when the action executes the intention.
But that is not the only way. An action of carjacking is made worse by a conditional intention to kill if necessary to accomplish the carjacking even when
the action does nothing to execute the intention. 59 Carjacking while willing
to kill is a worse action than carjacking while unwilling to do so. More fundamentally, criminal actions are often made bad, worse, or blameworthy by
mental states that the actions in question simply couldn’t be said to execute.
When the mental state is reckless indifference to a risked outcome, the mental state can be said to actuate the action only in the attenuated counterfactual sense of failing to prevent it. But reckless indifference certainly can
transform the action’s moral character, making the action a distinctive kind
of wrong punishable as such. That is why punishment for reckless driving is
punishment for driving recklessly, rather than the conjunction of punishment for driving and punishment for recklessness.
Another type of mental state that can affect an action’s moral quality
even when it does not cause or motivate the action is an actor’s associated
emotional attitude. Compare Kenneth Simons’s two sadistic murderers, one
who “kill[s] the victim in a particularly brutal manner for the very purpose
of obtaining pleasure in the victim’s suffering,” and another who “kills his
victim in a brutal manner and discovers, to his surprise, that this brings him
great pleasure.” 60 Simons doubts that the second killer’s sadistic joy should
“count in favor of imposing a much heavier punishment,” 61 because neither
that joy nor its prospect plays any kind of causal or motivational role in the
killing. Simons’s assumption is that an offender’s accompanying emotion
should increase his punishment only if it motivates his crime. But what motivates this assumption? The killer’s sadistic joy plainly makes his action
worse, so why shouldn’t it increase his punishment? Insisting on a motivational link strikes me as dogmatic.
Simons’s answer is that increasing the killer’s punishment on account of
an emotion that plays no motivational role would amount to punishing the
killer for bad character. As Simons asserts in a related context, “The question
for criminal law should be whether the actor’s attitude influenced the fact or
the manner of the killing, not whether it demonstrates his good or bad character in responding to the killing.” 62 But this question presupposes a false di59. Section 2119 of title 18 of the United States Code makes it a crime to engage in carjacking “with the intent to cause death.” 18 U.S.C. § 2119. As the Supreme Court interprets
§ 2119, a carjacker’s lethal intention will satisfy the statute’s mens rea requirement even if the
intention is conditional—that is, even if what the carjacker intends is to kill the car’s owner only
on the condition that doing so is necessary to accomplish the carjacking. See Holloway v. United
States, 526 U.S. 1, 12 (1999).
60. Kenneth W. Simons, Punishment and Blame for Culpable Indifference, 58 INQUIRY
143, 155 (2015).
61 . Id . at 155–56.
62 . Id . at 153.
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chotomy: that an actor’s attitude either bears a causal influence on “the fact
or the manner” of his crime or merely “demonstrates his . . . bad character.” 63
The dichotomy is false because even if an actor’s attitude isn’t what motivates the actor’s conduct, it can do more than merely demonstrate the actor’s
bad character: it can affect the nature and moral quality of the actor’s action.
We can see this moral consequence not only in Simons’s second example
(where the sadistic pleasure plays no motivational role) but in his first example (where the desire for sadistic pleasure motivates the killing). That desire
makes the killing cruel and therefore morally worse. But other things can
have these moral consequences as well, and one of them is the pleasure desired and attained. Unlike its prospect, the pleasure contemporaneous with
the action isn’t part of what motivates it. But that contemporaneous pleasure
affects the action’s moral quality all the same.
A killer’s sadistic pleasure, a carjacker’s conditional intention, a driver’s
recklessness—all of these things help show us that concurrence is a moral
relation, not in the first instance a merely psychological one. The actus reus
and mens rea elements of an offense concur when the mental state transforms the act’s moral character—by making it bad, worse, or blameworthy.
This moral relation can obtain between an act and a mental state even when
they do not stand in a relation of causation, motivation, or execution. 64
Understanding the doctrine of concurrence in moral terms reveals its
perhaps surprising centrality to criminal jurisprudence. Commentators often
treat the concurrence requirement as an obscure curiosity, important only to
the resolution of improbable niceties like the issue at the heart of the Idaho
case State v . Hopple 65: whether A is guilty of larceny (taking another’s property with the intent to steal it) if he corrals B’s sheep to stop them from
trampling A’s cattle feed, and only later decides to steal them. (The court’s
answer: No. “[I]f the jury believed from the evidence that the defendant had
no felonious intent to steal the sheep at the time they came into his possession he would not be guilty of larceny even if he subsequently conceived the
intent to appropriate them.” 66) Given how rarely this sort of esoteric question arises, it is no surprise that a leading criminal law casebook doesn’t
mention the concurrence requirement at all, even as it spends two pages on
an analytical exposition of the decidedly marginal doctrine of transferred intent (by which an offender who fires a gun at A, intending to kill A but missing, can be held liable for intentional murder nonetheless if the bullet strikes
63 . Id .
64. Recent sophisticated analyses of the concurrence requirement plainly recognize that
concurrence is in some respect a moral relation. But they go astray in supposing that the moral
relation requires a causal or motivational link. See Alexander F. Sarch, Knowledge, Recklessness
and the Connection Requirement Between Actus Reus and Mens Rea, 120 PENN ST. L. REV. 1
(2015); Kenneth W. Simons, Does Punishment for “Culpable Indifference” Simply Punish for
“Bad Character”? Examining the Requisite Connection Between Mens Rea and Actus Reus, 6
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 219 (2002); Yaffe, supra note 53, at 174.
65. 357 P.2d 656 (Idaho 1960).
66 . Hopple, 357 P.2d at 659.
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and kills B). 67 But if criminal jurisprudence properly contains an action-asobject requirement, then the doctrine of concurrence isn’t like the doctrine
of transferred intent, an exotic ratchet to be pulled from the satchel on the
rare occasion when no other tool will fit the bolt. Instead, the concurrence
requirement is like the voluntary act requirement, a principle rarely
breached, and thus rarely invoked, but still critical. Conceived in moral
terms, which is how the action-as-object requirement invites us to conceive
the concurrence requirement, it serves to ensure that the actus reus and
mens rea components of an offense are parts of a unity rather than a mere
aggregate. Compliance with the concurrence requirement thereby promotes
compliance with the action-as-object requirement, the former serving as an
implementing doctrine of the latter. 68
III. THE ACTION-AS-OBJECT REQUIREMENT IN CRITICAL COMMENTARY AND
JUDICIAL REASONING
Although courts and commentators don’t denominate the action-asobject requirement an official axiom of criminal jurisprudence, I suggest that
they nevertheless feel the principle’s attraction. Implicit appeals to the action-as-object requirement figure not only in legal commentary but also in
judicial reasoning, particularly regarding offenses crafted in the subjectivist
style and accordingly susceptible to the charge of criminalizing thought. Although versions of the offense of attempt occasionally draw this charge, 69
critics more often train their sights on what may appear to them more extreme instances of subjectivist legislation, such as hate crimes and the highly
inchoate offenses prototypical of the legal fight against terrorism. In this
Part, I’ll show how critics complaining about such legislation invoke the ac-

67. SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 618–19 (10th ed.
2017).
68 . It would perhaps be more accurate to call the concurrence requirement a partial
implementing doctrine of the action-as-object requirement, because satisfaction of the concurrence requirement enables but does not guarantee compliance with the action-as-object requirement. For example, attempters punished under a subjectivist attempt statute will be
punished for their intentions (in violation of the action-as-object requirement) even as their
intentions may concur with actions constituting the offense’s actus reus.
69 . See, e .g ., Jerome B. Elkind, Impossibility in Criminal Attempts: A Theorist’s Headache, 54 VA. L. REV. 20, 30–32 (1968) (implying that punishing offenders for “impossible” attempts would amount to punishing them for their mere thoughts); Graham Hughes, One
Further Footnote on Attempting the Impossible, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1005, 1026 (1967) (“Professor
[Glanville] Williams [a subjectivist] is inviting us to say that attempted murder can be doing
anything while thinking (mistakenly) that you are going to cause X. This is a dangerous invitation which should be rejected, since it provides no criterion whatsoever for characterizing an
act as an attempt other than the mistaken view under which it is being done, and is thus . . .
tantamount to punishment for intention alone.”); Ken Levy, It’s Not Too Difficult: A Plea to
Resurrect the Impossibility Defense, 45 N.M. L. REV. 225, 273 (2014) (“Criminalizing attempted
murder by means of implausible causal theories [e.g., voodoo] seems dangerously close to
criminalizing the sincere hope that somebody dies accompanied by the slightest act in this direction . . . .”).
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tion-as-object requirement implicitly. I’ll also show how courts and other
legal officials adhere to the action-as-object requirement when answering
these complaints, even as they reject them.
Currently in force in the leading Anglophone jurisdictions are a set of
statutes that criminalize conduct broadly related to terrorism but too incipient or insubstantial to be punishable under traditional principles of attempt
or complicity. Such statutes in Canada and the United States serve primarily
to expand the scope of accomplice liability, 70 while the highly inchoate counterterrorism statutes in Australia and the United Kingdom serve primarily to
expand the scope of attempt liability. In particular, section 101.6(1) of the
Australian Criminal Code provides that “[a] person commits an offence if
the person does any act in preparation for, or planning, a terrorist act,” 71 and
section 5(1) of the United Kingdom’s Terrorism Act 2006 similarly provides
that “[a] person commits an offence if, with the intention of . . . committing
acts of terrorism . . . he engages in any conduct in preparation for giving effect to his intention.” 72 Other highly inchoate counterterrorism statutes in
the United Kingdom push even further beyond the conventional bounds of
attempt and accomplice liability by creating unusually broad offenses of possession. For example, section 58(1) of the United Kingdom’s Terrorism Act
2000 creates an offense of “collect[ing] . . . information of a kind likely to be
useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism . . . [or] possess[ing] a document or record containing information of that kind.” 73 Section 58 grants a defense to anyone who can “prove that he had a reasonable
excuse for his action or possession.” 74
These and similar statutes are sometimes said to criminalize thought, or
to come “dangerously close” to doing so. 75 It isn’t hard to see why. For one
thing, the acts these statutes nominally proscribe can be utterly trivial. Section 5(1) of the United Kingdom’s Terrorism Act 2006 criminalizes “engaging in any conduct in preparation for giving effect to [a terroristic]
intention.” As A.P. Simester observes, section 5(1) seems “to proscribe acts
of cereal eating . . . when done as part of a fitness programme in preparation
for committing a terrorist act.” 76 Creating an offense of comparable breadth
is section 58(1) of the 2000 Act, which criminalizes collecting information
70. Section 83.19 of the Canadian Criminal Code imposes liability on anyone “who
knowingly facilitates a terrorist activity.” Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46, 83.19(1).
Sections 2339A and 2339B of title 18 of the United States Code criminalize the provision of
“material support” to terrorists and terrorist organizations, including “seemingly benign support,” such as instruction in how to conduct peaceful negotiations. Holder v. Humanitarian
Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 36 (2010).
71 . Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 101.6(1) (Austl.).
72. Terrorism Act 2006, c. 11, § 5(1) (UK).
73. Terrorism Act 2000, c. 11, § 58(1) (UK).
74 . Id . § 58(3).
75. ROACH, supra note 2, at 449.
76. AP Simester, Prophylactic Crimes, in SEEKING SECURITY: PRE-EMPTING THE
COMMISSION OF CRIMINAL HARMS 59, 71 (G.R. Sullivan & Ian Dennis eds., 2012).
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“useful” to terrorists. “[A]lmost anything that is of general use in carrying
out our day-to-day activities is also useful to terrorists,” note Jacqueline
Hodgson and Victor Tadros. 77 “Terrorists might need clean clothes, so washing machine instructions are useful to terrorists. . . . It might be advantageous to terrorists in distracting the authorities to appear to have a sense of
humour, so joke books might be useful to terrorists.” 78
The severe penalties associated with these counterterrorism statutes 79
give critics a further reason to suspect that the underlying wrongs being
condemned and sanctioned are not the potentially trifling acts that the statutes nominally proscribe but the malign intentions that motivate them. Under section 5(1) of the 2006 Act, a person can go to prison for life “if, with
the intention of . . . committing acts of terrorism . . . he engages in any conduct in preparation for giving effect to his intention.” 80 What is the underlying wrong section 5(1) condemns and sanctions so severely? Is it the
potentially trifling act of preparation? Or is it instead the terroristic intention
to which that act gives effect? Alun Jones and coauthors comment that, “[i]f
no other criminal offence is available to try a terrorist suspect, the use of
[section 5] would surely imply that the person was being tried principally for
having criminal thoughts, the actus reus of any offence being non-specific
and very easy to prove.” 81 Hodgson and Tadros voice a similar concern
about the information-collection offense created by section 58(1) of the 2000
Act. They see “the offence [as] really [being] designed . . . to capture people
who are suspected to have a terrorist intent.” 82 Clive Walker adds that section 5(2) makes it “expressly irrelevant whether the intention and preparations relate to one or more particular acts of terrorism, acts of terrorism of a
particular description, or acts of terrorism generally. It is not just that the

77. Jacqueline Hodgson & Victor Tadros, How to Make a Terrorist Out of Nothing, 72
MOD. L. REV. 984, 985 (2009).
78 . Id .
79. Terrorism Act 2006, c. 11, § 5(1) (UK) (providing that a person guilty of preparing
for a terrorist act is liable to imprisonment for life); Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 101.6(1)
(Austl.) (same); 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2018) (providing that a person guilty of providing material
support to terrorists “shall be fined . . . , imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both, and, if the
death of any person results, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life”); 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339B (providing that a person guilty of providing material support to foreign terrorist organization “shall be fined . . . or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both, and, if the death
of any person results, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life”); Canada Criminal
Code, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46, 83.19(1) (“Every one who knowingly facilitates a terrorist activity is
guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen
years.”); Terrorism Act 2000, c. 11, § 57(4) (UK) (providing that a violation of section 57(1)
(possession for terrorist purposes) is punishable by up to fifteen years in prison); id. § 58(4)
(providing that a violation of section 58(1) (collection of information useful to terrorists) is
punishable by up to fifteen years in prison).
80. Terrorism Act 2006, § 5(1) (emphasis added).
81. ALUN JONES ET AL., BLACKSTONE’S GUIDE TO THE TERRORISM ACT 2006 § 3.05
(2006) (emphasis added).
82. Hodgson & Tadros, supra note 77, at 989.
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‘exact plans are unknown’ but that the offence approximates to ‘having criminal thoughts.’ ” 83 As Andrew Asworth puts it, “[t]he essence of the offense is
the intention, coupled with a preparatory act of some kind.” 84
These complaints don’t allege a violation of the act requirement, which
says (only) that the conditions of liability must include an act. Nor do these
complaints allege a violation of Justinian’s maxim, which says (only) that if
an intention serves as an object of liability, it mustn’t be wholly unexecuted.
Each of the statutes just described includes an act as a condition of liability,
an act that somehow manifests the accompanying mental state. If we take
critics’ complaints literally, what they find objectionable about these statutes
is that the statutes treat mental states as objects of sanction and censure.
They find this objectionable not because the mental states targeted are mere
mental states—they aren’t—but because they are mental states rather than
actions. To find this objectionable is to presuppose the action-as-object requirement.
No prosecutor has charged a terrorism defendant with eating cereal in
furtherance of a terror plot or possessing a joke book with the intent to
commit a terrorist act. But prosecutors’ very reluctance to bring such charges
evinces fidelity to the action-as-object requirement. Given the robust intelligence-gathering capabilities of western governments, I doubt that the only
reason for prosecutorial restraint is evidentiary uncertainty. Just as likely,
prosecutors intuit, or expect judges and juries to intuit, that a minor act of
possession or preparation, even if done in furtherance of a terrorist plot, is a
trivial wrong, perhaps too trivial to merit punishment, or if not too trivial to
merit punishment, then unworthy of more than a slap on the wrist—even
though the intention that motivates the action might itself be a serious moral
breach worthy of substantial censure. This intuition channels the action-asobject requirement, which demands that punishment be apportioned to the
gravity of an offender’s action, rather than to the gravity of any associated
state of mind.
The intuition is one that courts seem to share. Because prosecutors don’t
charge cereal eaters and joke-book possessors with counterterrorism offenses, we don’t know how courts would deal with such a charge. But we do
know how courts have responded to a defendant’s argument that a statute
criminalizes thought despite nominally proscribing an act. What we know is
that courts have virtually always deflected this sort of challenge by construing the statute in question in such a way that complies not only with the act
requirement and Justinian’s maxim but also with the action-as-object requirement.

83. Clive Walker, The Impact of Contemporary Security Agendas Against Terrorism on
the Substantive Criminal Law, in POST 9/11 AND THE STATE OF PERMANENT LEGAL
EMERGENCY 121, 130 (Aniceto Masferrer ed., 2012) (quoting 438 Parl Deb HC (6th ser.) (2005)
col. 999 (UK) (statement of Paul Goggins), and JONES ET AL., supra note 81, § 3.05).
84. Andrew Ashworth, Attempts, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY OF
CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 9, at 125, 127.
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A perennial target of such challenges is an older inchoate offense similar
in structure to the counterterrorism crimes that I just discussed. The offense
is section 2423(b) of title 18 of the United States Code, which provides that
“[a] person who travels in interstate commerce . . . for the purpose of engaging in any illicit sexual conduct with another person shall be fined . . . or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.” 85 This “traveler” statute is a
stock-in-trade of the federal government’s effort to combat child sex abuse.
It enables the government to prosecute pedophiles intercepted on their way
to clandestine rendezvous with children (or with police officers posing as
children). Defendants convicted under § 2423(b) have argued that the statute
“criminalizes ‘mere thought’ ”; 86 that it “lacks a ‘meaningful actus reus’ and
punishes the mere act of thinking while traveling”; 87 and that it “requires
merely the crossing of state lines with illegal thoughts to effectuate federal
jurisdiction.” 88
Every court confronted with such an argument has acknowledged that
the interstate-travel element in § 2423(b) serves to ensure federal jurisdiction. But none has accepted a challenger’s invitation to interpret the interstate-travel element as exclusively jurisdictional. In particular, none has
deemed an offender’s malevolent intention the underlying object of sanction
and censure. To save § 2423(b) from imposing punishment for a defendant’s
intention to “engag[e] in . . . illicit sexual conduct,” courts have uniformly
interpreted the traveler statute as punishing wrongful travel, not wrongful
intent. Representative of this approach is the opinion of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in United States v . Tykarsky:
[T]he relationship between the mens rea and the actus reus required by
§ 2423(b) is neither incidental nor tangential. Section 2423(b) does not
simply prohibit traveling with an immoral thought, or even with an amorphous intent to engage in sexual activity with a minor in another state. The
travel must be for the purpose of engaging in the unlawful sexual act. By requiring that the interstate travel be “for the purpose of” engaging in illicit
sexual activity, Congress has narrowed the scope of the law to exclude mere
preparation, thought or fantasy; the statute only applies when the travel is a
necessary step in the commission of a crime. 89

The implication is plain: if a defendant violates § 2423(b) only when his act
of interstate travel is “a necessary step in the commission of a crime,” then
we plausibly might suppose (even if it doesn’t follow necessarily) that the
statute imposes punishment for a wrongful action, not for a bad intention.

85. 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) (2018).
86. United States v. Gamache, 156 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1998) (quoting Brief of DefendantAppellant at 15–16, Gamache, 156 F.3d 1 (No. 97-2418)).
87. United States v. Tykarsky, 446 F.3d 458, 471 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Brief of Appellant Todd Tykarsky at 61, Tykarsky, 446 F.3d 458 (No. 06-3663)).
88. United States v. Han, 230 F.3d 560, 562 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Brief of DefendantAppellant Pierce S. Han at 5, Han, 230 F.3d 560 (No. 99-1759)).
89 . Tykarsky, 446 F.3d at 471 (citation omitted).
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Some observers will be inclined to dismiss the Third Circuit’s interpretation of § 2423(b) as little more than a disingenuous piece of judicial apologetics for a brazen piece of legislative subterfuge. It is just obvious, they’ll
insist, that Congress’s true aim in enacting § 2423(b) was to punish pedophiles for intending to “engag[e] in . . . illicit sexual conduct,” not for stepping across imaginary lines. My purpose at this juncture is not to adjudicate
any such dispute—I’ll attempt that in the next Part—but to emphasize what
the dispute’s very occurrence implies. The Third Circuit could have agreed
with the defendant that his state of mind was the true object of punishment,
his act of interstate travel being but a jurisdictional hook, or a proxy for the
seriousness of his intent, or both. Interpreting the statute in one of these
ways wouldn’t have contravened the act requirement or Justinian’s maxim.
But it would have contravened the action-as-object requirement . It is therefore significant that the Third Circuit chose to assign the actus reus of
§ 2423(b) a robust substantive role. The court held that “the statute only applies when the [offender’s] travel is a necessary step in the commission of a
crime,” 90 and the court twice contrasted such acts of interstate travel with
“mere preparation.” 91
The Third Circuit is no anomaly. In virtually every case where a defendant challenged § 2423(b) on the ground that it criminalizes mere thought despite nominally proscribing an act, the court responded by interpreting the
statute in such a way as to render it consistent with the action-as-object requirement. 92 In most of these cases, moreover, the court explicitly required
that defendants have performed actions beyond “mere preparation.” This
further requirement is significant because actions that bring an intending
criminal close to completion tend to be considerably more dangerous, and to
that extent more wrongful, than actions of mere preparation. If courts understand § 2423(b) to apply to a set of actions that are especially wrongful—
acts beyond “mere preparation”—then it is all the likelier that these actions,
rather than the intentions with which they are performed, are being treated
as the objects of punishment under the statute. It is no point to the contrary
that some courts also emphasize that the act of interstate travel provides evidence of the requisite intent. If courts regarded the act of interstate travel as
serving no purpose but an evidentiary one, they presumably would require
prosecutors to prove that a defendant’s act evinced or corroborated his criminal intent. But you’ll find no such requirement in the model jury instructions of any federal circuit.
In short, courts almost always reject a defendant’s claim that a statute
criminalizes thought despite proscribing an act. An instructive exception is

90 . Id . (emphasis added).
91 . Id .
92 . See, e .g ., id . (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) “does not punish thought alone”);
United States v. Bredimus, 352 F.3d 200, 208 (5th Cir. 2003) (same); United States v. Stephen,
19 F. App’x 196, 198 (6th Cir. 2001) (same); Han, 230 F.3d at 563 (same); Gamache, 156 F.3d at
8 (same); United States v. Kaechele, 466 F. Supp. 2d 868, 896 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (same).
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Doe v. City of Lafayette.93 The plaintiff, Doe, was a pedophile who argued
that he had been punished for his sexual thoughts about children.94 He
hadn’t been prosecuted for stepping across state lines, however. In fact, he
hadn’t been prosecuted at all. Instead, he had been subjected to an ad hoc
administrative order banning him indefinitely from all city parks in Lafayette, Indiana.95 City officials issued the order after receiving an anonymous
tip that Doe had stood around in a park watching children play while thinking about molesting them.96 The city imposed the ban without a formal process and made no claim that the order was a sanction for an alleged legal
violation.97 A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit nevertheless treated the order as a punishment, holding that
the city had impermissibly punished Doe for his mere thoughts:
Doe’s behavior [did] not rise to the level of an action of sufficient gravity to
justify punishment. The error in punishing actions similar to Doe’s is more
easily seen by way of analogies removed from the sensitive context of child
molestation. By way of comparison, we would not sanction criminal punishment of an individual with a criminal history of bank robbery . . . simply
because she or he stood in the parking lot of a bank and thought about robbing it. It goes without saying that in this hypothetical the individual would
not have taken an action that could support punishment. Or, as a different
example, punishment of a drug addict who stands outside a dealer’s house
craving a hit but successfully resists the urge to enter and purchase drugs
would be offensive to our understanding of the bounds of the criminal
law. . . . [B]oth of these situations, analogous to the actions taken by Doe
here, present clear examples of actions that do not reach a level of criminal
culpability necessary to justify punishment.98

As the panel’s opinion implies, if standing around in a park does “not rise to
the level of an action of sufficient gravity to justify punishment,” then standing around in a park can’t have been the true object of Doe’s punishment.
The true object must have been Doe’s thoughts. “[T]he City acknowledges
that Doe’s own revelation of his thoughts, not any outward indication of his
thinking, [was] the basis for its actions,” wrote the panel majority.99 “[T]he
circumstances make clear that the ban order issued by the City resulted from
its concern about Doe’s fantasies about children.”100

93. 334 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 2003), rev’d en banc, 377 F.3d 757 (7th Cir. 2004).
94. Doe, 334 F.3d at 607.
95. Clay Calvert, Freedom of Thought, Offensive Fantasies and the Fundamental Human
Right to Hold Deviant Ideas: Why the Seventh Circuit Got It Wrong in Doe v. City of Lafayette,
Indiana, 3 PIERCE L. REV. 125, 140 (2005).
96. Id. at 139 (suggesting that the anonymous tip came from a fellow member of Doe’s
sex-addict support group).
97. See id. at 140.
98. Doe, 334 F.3d at 612.
99. Id. at 608.
100. Id. at 611.
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Doe’s victory was short-lived. The Seventh Circuit reheard the case en
banc and rejected the panel’s conclusion. The en banc court emphasized the
gravity of Doe’s conduct, deeming his action and not his accompanying
thought the true object of punishment. The en banc court rejected what it
saw as Doe’s unduly narrow description of the action that had precipitated
his punishment, focusing instead on the entire course of conduct leading to
Doe’s moment in the park:
The City . . . did not ban [Doe] from the public parks because he admitted to having sexual fantasies about children in his home or even in a
coffee shop. The inescapable reality is that Mr. Doe did not simply entertain thoughts; he brought himself to the brink of committing child molestation. He had sexual urges directed toward children, and he took dangerous
steps toward gratifying his urges by going to a place where he was likely to
find children in a vulnerable situation.
To characterize the ban as directed at “pure thought” would require us
to close our eyes to Mr. Doe’s actions. 101

The en banc court thus disposed of Doe’s claim in the same way that
other courts have deflected challenges to § 2423(b): by identifying an action
that the defendant performed in furtherance of his illicit intention and by
labeling that action, not his illicit intention, the true object of punishment.
This sort of judicial response serves as a threefold rejoinder to the charge
that a statute punishes thought. First, the response emphasizes that the statute includes an act among the conditions of liability, which shows that the
statute satisfies the voluntary act requirement. Second, the response establishes that the required act executes the required mental state, which shows
that the statute satisfies Justinian’s maxim. Third, and most important for
our purposes, the response establishes (or purports to establish) that the true
wrong punished by the statute is the offender’s conduct, which shows that
the statute satisfies the action-as-object requirement. No court has responded to one of these challenges by saying, “Yes, the statute in question punishes
thought, but the thought it punishes is executed in conduct, so the defendant
is without a claim.” No court has openly said anything inconsistent with the
action-as-object requirement.
What courts say they’re doing is of course far from the last word on
what they’re actually doing. But it is the first word, and we should take it seriously. 102 No doubt we also should look beyond what courts say. We may
find courts doing things very different from what they say they’re doing.

101. Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757, 766–67 (7th Cir. 2004). The en banc court
added for good measure that the order banning Doe from the parks “was not [punishment] at
all. Rather, the ban was a civil (i.e., nonpunitive) measure designed for the protection of the
public.” Id . at 766 n.8.
102 . Cf . J.L. AUSTIN, PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 185 (J.O. Urmson & G.J. Warnock eds., 3d
ed. 1979) (“[O]rdinary language is not the last word [on philosophical questions]: in principle
it can everywhere be supplemented and improved upon and superseded. Only remember, it is
the first word.”).
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That discovery should lead us to give judicial language more attention, not
less. If no court has ever embraced subjectivism outright—and, as far as I
know, none has—that is a striking fact worthy of serious attention.
A reluctance to contradict the action-as-object requirement also seems
to unite both sides in the classic dispute over the permissibility of hate crime
penalty-enhancement provisions like the one before the Supreme Court in
Wisconsin v . Mitchell. 103 The case concerned a Wisconsin provision that increases the maximum penalty for assault from two years to seven “whenever
[a] defendant ‘[i]ntentionally selects the [victim] . . . because of [his] race,
religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry.’ ” 104
Before the case reached the Supreme Court, the Wisconsin high court held
that the enhancement provision impermissibly punished offenders for their
thoughts, 105 siding with a view broadly endorsed by critics of hate crime
laws. 106 Heidi Hurd and Michael Moore state the view succinctly:
The underlying criminal act, together with the mens rea to commit that act
(for example, the intentionality of the act), is already punished by existing
criminal law. The enhanced penalty attached by hate/bias crime legislation
is [therefore] not for the underlying act, nor is it for the intentionality with

103. 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
104. Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 480 (quoting WIS. STAT. § 939.645(1)(b) (1989–1990)).
105 . Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 811–13 (Wis. 1992), rev’d, 508 U.S. 476
(1993).
106 . Id . at 812–13 (“[A] charge of ethnic intimidation must always be predicated on certain offenses proscribed elsewhere in a state’s criminal code. As those offenses are already punishable, all that remains is an additional penalty for the actor’s reasons for his or her actions.”
(footnote omitted) (quoting Susan Gellman, Sticks and Stones Can Put You in Jail, but Can
Words Increase Your Sentence? Constitutional and Policy Dilemmas of Ethnic Intimidation
Laws, 39 UCLA L. REV. 333, 363 (1991) [hereinafter Gellman, Sticks and Stones])); see also
JAMES B. JACOBS & KIMBERLY POTTER, HATE CRIMES: CRIMINAL LAW & IDENTITY POLITICS
121 (1998) (“Generic criminal laws already punish injurious conduct; so recriminalization or
sentence enhancement for the same injurious conduct when it is motivated by prejudice
amounts to extra punishment for values, beliefs, and opinions . . . . If the purpose of hate crime
laws is to punish more severely offenders who are motivated by prejudices, is that not equivalent to punishing . . . hate thought?”); Larry Alexander, The ADL Hate Crime Statute and the
First Amendment, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Summer/Fall 1992, at 49, 49 (“If one is punished an extra amount for acting with a bigoted motive, where the justification is the pure retributive one
that the bigoted motive reflects a morally depraved bigoted character, then one is being punished the extra amount for being a bigot. And if one is being punished for being a bigot, one is
being punished for believing what bigots believe.”); Gellman, supra note 2, at 514–15 (“The
only substantive element of most hate crime statutes is that the defendant had a bias motive for
committing the base offense. As motive consists solely of the defendant’s thoughts, the additional penalty for motive amounts to a thought crime . . . .” (footnote omitted)); Heidi M. Hurd
& Michael S. Moore, Punishing Hatred and Prejudice, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1081, 1128–29 (2004);
Martin H. Redish, Freedom of Thought as Freedom of Expression: Hate Crime Sentencing Enhancement and First Amendment Theory, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Summer/Fall 1992, at 29, 37–38
(“Because [sentencing enhancement] laws are adopted for the very purpose of penalizing
thought processes and political motivations found to be offensive by those in power, they constitute classic abridgements of the constitutionally protected freedom of thought . . . . Hate
crime sentencing laws punish nothing more than internal motivation . . . .”).
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which it is committed; it is for the hatred or prejudice that motivated the
defendant to form and act on that intent. 107

The complaint asserted here is not that hate crime penalty-enhancement
provisions empower the state to impose punishment in the absence of an act,
which would be a violation of the voluntary act requirement. The complaint
is rather that these enhancement provisions empower the state to condemn
and sanction an offender for something in addition to an act—namely, a
hateful state of mind. To voice this complaint is to invoke the action-asobject requirement, which demands that punishment be imposed only for
actions and omissions, separate punishment for thoughts or character being
impermissible.
Although the Supreme Court ultimately adjudged the complaint meritless, reversing the Wisconsin high court and upholding the hate crime penalty-enhancement law, its decision in Mitchell said nothing inconsistent with
the action-as-object requirement. The Supreme Court concluded that the
Wisconsin law punished conduct, not thought, 108 reasoning that “biasinspired conduct . . . inflict[s] greater individual and societal harm.” 109
Whether the Supreme Court or the Wisconsin high court had the better of
this dispute is a question I’ll address in the next Part. My present purpose
has been to emphasize that neither side in the dispute took a position inconsistent with the action-as-object requirement. Although the Supreme Court
didn’t grant the relief that the challengers sought, it didn’t question their assumption that the law must never treat a person’s mental states as separate
objects of punishment. To my knowledge, no American court has ever
avowedly tolerated a violation of the action-as-object requirement.
IV. ARE HATE CRIME LAWS AND TERRORISM OFFENSES THOUGHT CRIMES?
What remains to be determined is whether the law adheres as rigorously
to the action-as-object requirement as judicial discourse apparently assumes.
I believe it does not. But the matter is trickier than critics allow, and in this
Part I’ll try to explain why, starting with the subject of hate crime laws.
Like Hurd and Moore, James Jacobs and Kimberly Potter present the
problem with hate crime laws as a matter of basic arithmetic: “Generic criminal laws already punish injurious conduct; so recriminalization or sentence
enhancement for the same injurious conduct when it is motivated by prejudice amounts to extra punishment for values, beliefs, and opinions . . . .” 110
Jacobs and Potter appear to be drawing the following inference: if a crime
motivated by hatred or prejudice is punished more harshly than an otherwise identical crime not so motivated, then the difference in punishment

107.
108 .
109 .
110.

Hurd & Moore, supra note 106, at 1128–29.
Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 484.
Id . at 487–88.
JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 106, at 121.
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necessarily amounts to separate punishment for the offender’s hatred or
prejudice.
If Jacobs and Potter are drawing this inference, then they are guilty of a
kind of subtractive fallacy. 111 When the law provides that some aggravating
factor increases the punishment for a given crime, one need not (and generally ought not) construe the additional quantum of punishment as separate
punishment for the aggravating factor. In Michigan, offenders who commit a
robbery can ordinarily be punished by up to fifteen years in prison, 112 but if
they “represent[] orally . . . that . . . [they are] in possession of a dangerous
weapon,” they can be punished by up to life in prison. 113 Suppose you are
sentenced to twenty-five years after committing a robbery in the course of
which you claimed to have a gun. I submit that it would be exceedingly odd,
even absurd, to say that your prison sentence represents punishment for two
separate wrongs—fifteen years for the robbery and ten for the statement
about the gun. Your statement surely doesn’t warrant ten years in prison; in
itself it might not warrant any punishment at all. But the “armed” robbery, a
unitary wrong, could well warrant twenty-five years. Your statement increases the overall punishment by making the robbery a worse robbery, not
by serving as a separate wrong that receives a separate punishment. We
would commit a kind of subtractive fallacy if we subtracted the fifteen-year
maximum sentence for unarmed robbery from your twenty-five-year sentence for armed robbery and concluded that the law was imposing a ten-year
punishment for your having claimed to be armed. Punishment for armed
robbery can’t be disaggregated into multiple punishments for the offense’s
multiple constituents.
But can punishment for a bias-motived assault be disaggregated into
punishment for the assault and punishment for the bias? Here, by contrast,
the answer might be yes—but not by virtue of Jacobs and Potter’s fallacious
inference. Recall that the Wisconsin statute at issue increases the maximum
penalty for assault from two years to seven when an assault is motivated by
bias. I suggest that it isn’t the mere fact of the increase but rather the magnitude of the increase that gives us reason to consider whether biased offenders
receive “extra [i.e., separate] punishment for [their] values, beliefs, and opinions.” 114 If a bias-motivated assault doesn’t merit a sentence three-and-a-half
times longer than that which a bias-free assault merits, then the enhancement provision might treat an offender’s bias as a separate wrong, rather
than treating it as a separate wrong-making feature of the offender’s wrongful action.

111. Other commentators appear to trade on the same inference. See Alexander, supra
note 106, at 49; Gellman, Sticks and Stones, supra note 106, at 363; Hurd & Moore, supra note
106, at 1128–29.
112. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.530 (West 2014).
113 . Id . § 750.529.
114. JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 106, at 121.
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To resolve the matter decisively, we would need to determine whether
an offender’s overall sentence represents disproportionate punishment for
his actions, rather than the conjunction of appropriate punishment for his
actions and improper punishment for his bigoted thoughts. To distinguish
between these two scenarios, we would need to answer a more fundamental
question: Just how much additional punishment does an offense merit when
motivated by bias? This is a tremendously difficult question. 115 Its difficulty
might be part of the reason why so much controversy surrounds the issue of
whether hate crime laws impermissibly punish people for their thoughts.
Hate crime laws might be a genuinely hard case—perhaps an unresolvable
one. 116
But disproportionate punishment isn’t always so difficult to spot. If you
possess a subway map in order to find your way to a meeting of potential terrorists, could that act of possession truly merit fifteen years in prison? 117 If
you do push-ups in order to make yourself strong enough to hijack a bus,
could that act of preparation truly merit life? 118 If these are silly questions—
silly because the answer to each of them is obviously no—then the listed
punishments don’t befit the actions for which they are nominally imposed,
and the better part of each punishment might well represent punishment for
the associated intention taken as a separate wrong.
No court would impose such harsh sentences, of course, nor would any
prosecutor seek them. But these hypothetical scenarios are only the most extreme and therefore the most obvious examples of how the state’s treatment
of a terrorism defendant might raise questions about whether the law is violating the action-as-object requirement. Actual sentencing practice raises
these questions as well, even if not as dramatically. The Court of Appeal of
England and Wales recently issued guidance to lower courts on how to sentence offenders under section 5(1) of the Terrorism Act 2006, 119 which criminalizes “engaging in any conduct in preparation for giving effect to [a

115 . See, e .g ., FREDERICK M. LAWRENCE, PUNISHING HATE: BIAS CRIMES UNDER
AMERICAN LAW 45–63 (1999) (exploring different respects (e.g., culpability, harmfulness) in
which considerations of proportionality warrant imposing harsher punishment on bias offenders).
116. My response to Jacobs and Potter complements Carol Steiker’s, which rejects the
idea that hate crime laws stand apart from traditional penal laws in scrutinizing the quality of
an offender’s motives. See Carol S. Steiker, Punishing Hateful Motives: Old Wine in a New Bottle Revives Calls for Prohibition, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1857, 1871 (1999) (book review)
(“[N]ormative evaluation of reasons for action—of belief and attitude—are hardly foreign to
the criminal law as it now exists and as it has long existed.”).
117. Terrorism Act 2000, c. 11, § 58(4) (UK) (providing that a violation of section 58(1)
(collection of information useful to terrorists) is punishable by up to fifteen years in prison).
118 . Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 101.6(1) (Austl.) (providing that a person guilty of
preparing for terrorist act is liable to imprisonment for life); Terrorism Act 2006, c. 11, § 5(3)
(UK) (same).
119. R v. Kahar [2016] EWCA (Crim) 568 [24]–[36], [2016] 2 Cr. App. R(S) 32 [H12]
(Eng.).
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terroristic] intention.” 120 Although the court recommended increasing an
offender’s sentence in proportion to the gravity of his preparatory conduct—
thus honoring the action-as-object requirement in theory—the court nevertheless suggested multiyear prison terms for offenders whose preparatory
conduct was relatively insubstantial. For example, the court suggested a prison term of between twenty-one months and five years for “[a]n offender
who had never set out [to join a terrorist organisation] or who set out but the
circumstances were such that it was unlikely that he would go very far, or returned without going far, or who had a minor role in relation to [relatively
insignificant] intended acts.” 121 Would imposing a five-year sentence for
such minor preparatory conduct violate the action-as-object requirement?
There are at least three ways to answer this question. Maybe (1) a fiveyear sentence really does befit minor preparatory conduct because of the
sheer malignancy of a would-be terrorist’s ultimate objective. However trivial in itself, an act done for the purpose of executing a malign intention is to
that extent wrongful and therefore potentially an appropriate object of punishment—all the more so if the actor’s ultimate end is something truly horrible. So there is no absurdity in interpreting statutes like section 5(1) of the
Terrorism Act 2006 as imposing punishment for conduct rather than mere
intent. Even when trifling, the acts such statutes proscribe aren’t completely
innocent. Eating cereal as part of a terrorist training program might not do
much to further one’s terroristic intentions, but it still does something. Alternatively, maybe (2) a five-year sentence is too harsh a penalty for such
(relatively) minor preparatory conduct, so a portion of the sentence represents punishment for the offender’s terroristic intention. Or maybe (3) a
five-year sentence is too harsh a penalty for such minor preparatory conduct
but the whole sentence represents disproportionate punishment for the terrorist’s actions, none of it representing punishment for his terroristic intention.
These are the sorts of possibilities we would routinely be forced to evaluate and decide between if the criminal law contained an action-as-object
requirement. Distinguishing (2) from (3) is a difficult task that could require
us to divine what is in the hearts of prosecutors and judges. 122 Distinguishing
either (2) or (3) from (1) is also a difficult task, because of how hard it is to
assess a punishment’s proportionality. The best attempts to delineate a rigorous notion of proportionality still leave us ill-equipped to evaluate the
proportionality of particular sentences. John Deigh proposes that “the [appropriate] measure by which the severity of punishment is determined to be
proportional to the seriousness of the crime for which it is inflicted is the

120. Terrorism Act 2006, § 5(1).
121 . Kahar, [2016] 2 Cr. App. R(S) 32 [H12].
122 . See Gabriel S. Mendlow, Commentary, Divine Justice and the Library of Babel: Or,
Was Al Capone Really Punished for Tax Evasion?, 16 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 181 (2018) (arguing
that the wrong for which an offender is punished may depend on the motivations of various
legal officials).
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minimal amount of pain or loss necessary to preserve social order.” 123
Deigh’s measure of proportionality admirably exceeds the rigor of any retributive metaphor. But it is still so abstract that we can only speculate as to
whether a twenty-one-month sentence or a five-year sentence—or something in between or above or below these extremes—is the minimal amount
of pain or loss necessary to preserve social order when we are sentencing a
defendant who set out to join a terrorist organization and failed.
If criminal law contained an action-as-object requirement, it isn’t just
counterterrorism offenses and hate crime laws that could require us to grapple with these difficult questions. In theory, any conventional offense graded
in terms of an offender’s culpability could invite the question of whether an
offender convicted of a higher grade of the offense was being punished primarily for the aggravating mental state conceived as a separate wrong. Firstdegree murder is penalized more harshly than second-degree murder. Does
the incremental penalty associated with first-degree murder therefore represent separate punishment for the first-degree murderer’s aggravating state of
mind, conceived as a transgression unto itself?
That we don’t find ourselves asking such questions with any frequency
might be seen as evidence that the criminal law doesn’t contain an action-asobject requirement after all. Maybe it contains only a partial action-as-object
requirement, a principle demanding that an offender’s punishment be imposed at least in part, but not necessarily exclusively, for an action. Preference for a partial action-as-object requirement would explain the general
absence of controversy about whether first-degree murderers and other offenders are being punished in part for their thoughts. In most cases, it is
plain that at least part of an offender’s sentence represents punishment for
the offender’s actions. Only when an offender’s conduct is insubstantial or
highly incipient (or perhaps when the offender is subjected to a certain kind
of pretextual prosecution 124) does it seem possible that the offender’s punishment is imposed entirely for the offender’s state of mind. That would explain why counterterrorism laws of preparation and facilitation arouse the
fiercest criticism. In these cases, the gravity of an offender’s conduct is at its
lowest ebb. A general preference for a partial action-as-object requirement
also would explain why the subjectivist version of attempt liability is relatively uncontroversial. Subjectivist doctrines like the MPC’s “substantial step”
test require robust conduct. That makes it easy for reasonable onlookers to
convince themselves that, in practice, at least some portion of any attempter’s sentence represents punishment for the attempter’s actions.
As I said a moment ago, the fact that we don’t find ourselves asking
whether conventional offenses punish offenders for their thoughts might be

123. John Deigh, Punishment and Proportionality, 33 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 185, 185
(2014).
124 . See Mendlow, supra note 122 (raising the question whether defendants prosecuted
because of, and only because of, the state’s antipathy to their thoughts are punished for their
thoughts).
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seen as evidence that the criminal law contains only a partial action-asobject requirement. But it just as plausibly might be seen as evidence that the
criminal law contains a full action-as-object requirement that we rarely suspect the state is violating. When the state punishes harshly someone whose
conduct is insubstantial or incipient but whose attitudes and other mental
states generate intense social antipathy, then these mental states could well
be objects of punishment in their own right. Absent such factors—and such
factors are often absent—disproportionate punishment is probably just disproportionate punishment.
CONCLUSION
If our criminal legal system conformed to the action-as-object requirement, an offender’s conduct would serve always as the underlying object of
punishment and never merely as a proxy for the offender’s illicit state of
mind. Liability would arise only once the offender’s conduct was serious
enough to warrant sanction and censure, and the law would apportion the
offender’s punishment to the gravity of the offender’s conduct, not to the
gravity of any accompanying states of mind. Offenders whose conduct was
minimally wrongful would receive only a minimal punishment no matter
how malevolent their intentions.
Textbook criminal theory doesn’t include the action-as-object requirement among its axioms. Yet plausible principles of political morality strongly
support the requirement, critical commentary frequently presupposes it, and
judicial reasoning never flouts it. The action-as-object requirement is a moral aspiration of our law. If we made this aspiration explicit, we would conceive the seemingly miscellaneous axioms of criminal jurisprudence as a
cohesive set of principles that serve as a collective bulwark against thought
crime.

